Introduction
n Sunday, March 5, 1933, after a month-long run on American banks, the newly inaugurated President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, proclaimed a fourday suspension of all banking transactions, beginning the following day. The nation's stock exchanges also closed, even though they were not mentioned in the President's executive order. On Thursday, March 9, Roosevelt did not reopen the banks as planned; rather, he extended the closure for three days. Americans should have reacted in horror to the President's proclamation and his decision to abandon his original schedule. Instead, they waited to hear his plan.
Roosevelt's fifteen-minute radio address to the American people on Sunday evening, March 12-his first Fireside Chatinformed the public that only sound banks would be licensed to reopen by the U.S. Treasury: "I can assure you that it is safer to keep your money in a reopened bank than under the mattress."
1 Much to everyone's relief, when the institutions reopened for business on March 13, depositors stood in line to return their hoarded cash to neighborhood banks. Within two weeks, Americans had redeposited more than half of the currency that they had squirreled away before the suspension. • After a month-long run on banks, on March 5, 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared a nationwide Bank Holiday that shut down the banking system.
• The following week, in his first Fireside Chat, Roosevelt appealed directly to Americans to prevent a resumption of bank withdrawals; when the banks reopened on March 13, depositors stood in line to return their hoarded cash.
• The success of the Bank Holiday and the turnaround in public confidence can be attributed to the Emergency Banking Act of 1933, passed by Congress on March 9.
• The President used the emergency currency provisions of the Act to encourage the Federal Reserve to create de facto 100 percent deposit insurance in the reopened banks.
The market registered its approval as well. On March 15, 1933, the first day of trading after the extended closure, the New York Stock Exchange recorded the largest one-day percentage price increase ever. 2 With the benefit of hindsight, the nationwide
Bank Holiday in March 1933 ended the bank runs that had plagued the Great Depression. How, then, did Roosevelt manage to accomplish in one week what Herbert Hoover failed to do in three years?
Contemporary observers consider the Bank Holiday and the Fireside Chat a one-two punch that broke the back of the Great Depression. According to Beard and Smith (1940, p. 78) , "the sudden nationwide holiday performed the same function for the bank panic as may a slap in the face for a person gripped by unreasoning hysteria." Allen (1939, p. 111) notes that the bank reopening succeeded because "the people had been catapulted and persuaded by a president who seemed to believe in them and was giving them action. . . ." Alter (2006, p. 269) confirms the importance of Roosevelt's communication skills by quoting Will Rogers on the President's description of the reopening: "He made everyone understand it, even the bankers."
Roosevelt's oratory certainly played an important role, but only the financially naive would have believed that the government could examine thousands of banks in one week to identify those that should survive. According to Wigmore (1987, p. 752) , "The federal review procedure for reopening banks also had too many weaknesses to create much confidence, given the number of banks reopened, the speed with which they opened, and the lack of current information on them. There were no standards for judging which banks should reopen." Thus, Temin and Wigmore (1990, p. 491) dismiss the importance of the Bank Holiday: "The value of stocks . . . rose sharply from its trough in March-at the time of the Bank Holiday-to a peak in July. . . . This abrupt turnaround was hardly the result of the interregnum or the Bank Holiday itself. They contained bad news about the health of the economy. Only after Roosevelt's commitment to inflationary policies became clear during the Hundred Days did the value of stocks rise. The stock market rose and fell with the value of the dollar during 1933, illustrating dramatically the link between devaluation and expectations for the economy." 2 See Siegel (1998, p. 183 ). This article demonstrates that the Bank Holiday that began on March 6, 1933, marked the end of an old regime, and the Fireside Chat a week later inaugurated a new one. The Emergency Banking Act of 1933, passed by Congress on March 9-combined with the Federal Reserve's commitment to supply unlimited amounts of currency to reopened bankscreated de facto 100 percent deposit insurance. Moreover, the evidence shows that people recognized this guarantee and, as a result, believed the President on March 12, 1933, when he said that the reopened banks would be safer than the proverbial "money under the mattress." Confirmation of the turnaround in expectations came in two parts: the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose by a statistically significant 15.34 percent on March 15, 1933 (taking into account the two-week trading halt during the Bank Holiday), and by the end of the month, the public had returned to the banks two-thirds of the currency hoarded since the onset of the panic.
Together, the Emergency Banking Act and the de facto 100 percent deposit insurance created a safety net for banks and produced a regime shift with instantaneous results, similar to Sargent's (1986) description of "The Ends of Four Big Inflations." This result would come as no surprise to Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 434) , who observe that "Federal insurance of bank deposits was the most important structural change in the banking system to result from the 1933 panic, and . . . the structural change most conducive to monetary stability since state bank notes were taxed out of existence immediately after the Civil War." 3 However, Emergency Banking Act of 1933 and do not recognize the implicit guarantee for deposits in the reopened banks. Both Meltzer (2003, p. 423) and Wicker (1996, p. 146) maintain that the government understood the need to guarantee deposits in reopened banks, but they do not show that the public recognized this new policy and acted accordingly. Friedman and Schwartz correctly praise the stabilizing role of deposit insurance, but they do not distinguish between a 100 percent guarantee and the insurance program created by the FDIC that began on January 1, 1934. FDIC insurance caps its guarantee at a maximum dollar amount for each deposit account, initially set at $2,500. Small depositors with FDIC insurance did not have to worry about their accounts, but large depositors, who were only partially insured, could still be panicked into a run. Roosevelt's implicit 100 percent guarantee on March 12, 1933, convinced all depositors to trust the reopened banks.
The nationwide Bank Holiday in March 1933 was a unique event in American financial history. In the past, banks had suspended the convertibility of deposits into currency, but never had there been a complete stoppage of the entire U.S. payments system. The evidence presented here on the speed with which the Bank Holiday and the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 reestablished the integrity of the payments system demonstrates the power of credible regime-shifting policies.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the February 1933 banking system crisis that culminated in the formal suspension of all banking transactions upon Roosevelt's proclamation of a nationwide Bank Holiday. Section 3 reviews the reasons for the suspension, and Section 4 describes the solution to the crisis: the Emergency Banking Act of 1933. Evidence from the contemporary press confirms that an important segment of the American public understood the implicit federal guarantee for all deposits of reopened banks. Section 5 shows that people responded by redepositing the currency they had withdrawn and by bidding up stock prices. (Kennedy 1973; Wigmore 1985; Wicker 1996) . The failure of Ford and Ballantine to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution forced the governor to suspend banking operations in the entire state. The fallout from that decision gave new meaning to the law of unintended consequences. Instead of preventing a panic, the Michigan bank holiday precipitated one. The suspension confirmed the public's worst fears-that the banks were unsafe-and sparked a nationwide rush to cash. The damage from the February 14 Michigan proclamation came from contagion. According to Wicker (1996, p. 121 The rush to cash during the weeks following the Michigan bank holiday triggered bank closures or deposit restrictions in every state, even before Roosevelt's proclamation of March 5, 1933 (Wicker 1996 . According to the New York Times, "A bank holiday 'until further notice' was declared tonight [March 4] in Delaware, the last of the forty-eight states in which restrictions have been made."
9 However, there is disagreement over the precise number of bank holidays in force before Roosevelt's presidential decree. According to Friedman and Schwarz (1963, p. 325) , "By March 3, holidays in about half the states had been declared"; Meltzer (2003, p. 382) indicates "By inauguration day [March 4], thirty-five states had declared bank holidays"; and Alter (2006, p. 190) maintains "By the early evening of Friday March 3, banks in thirty-two of forty-eight states were closed." Why is there such confusion? To some extent, the disagreement stems from the use of different sources or time periods; only Wicker (1996) provides a reference for his discussion (the New York Times). The more likely source of confusion is that some states went to great lengths to avoid a de jure holiday. For example, the Chicago Tribune reported that "Indiana Governor Paul V. McNutt today informed state officials . . . [that] Indiana banks, under the new bank code law recently rushed through the state legislature, have the power to limit withdrawals to one-tenth of one percent. Therefore, no state-wide bank moratorium will be declared in Indiana." As these accounts suggest, Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not invent the bank holiday. So why is his March 5 proclamation credited with launching a process that was crucial to restoring confidence in America's banking system? The answer is that Roosevelt's initiative turned a maze of state restrictions into a uniform national policy. This action was the key first step to resolving the banking crisis: It shifted the 9 March 5, 1933 , p. F24. 10 March 5, 1933 , p. A5. 11 New York Times, March 5, 1933 Although the Associated Press listed New York as "closed," the New York Times (March 5, 1933, p. 23) reported that "At least two banks in New York City did not avail themselves of the banking holiday proclaimed yesterday by Governor Lehman. They were the Sterling National Bank, 1410 Broadway and the National Bank of Far Rockaway." responsibility for the integrity of the payments system to the federal government, where it belonged.
The Challenge
Roosevelt's challenge was to figure out how to reopen the banks without triggering a resumption of the deposit withdrawals that led to the suspensions. His solution-the Bank Holidaywas a more extensive form of bank suspension that had last occurred in the United States in 1907 under the national banking system. Indeed, Congress had established the Federal Reserve System in 1913 precisely to prevent banks from suspending the convertibility of deposits into currency. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 330) See Meltzer (2003, pp. 381-9) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 324-32) . 14 Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 330) emphasize that "The recorded capital figures were widely recognized as overstating the available capital because assets were being carried on the books at a value higher than their market value." 15 According to Wigmore (1987, p. 744) , weekly data show a $1. and what the next steps are going to be." In clear and simple terms, Roosevelt explained the procedure for reopening the banks and claimed that only sound banks would be reopened. The novelty of this event is captured by the description, the day after the talk, in the Christian Science Monitor: "He speaks to the nation over the radio in what is quite possibly the most remarkable address ever made by any President. In man-toman fashion, in words of only one syllable, he uses the tones of a friend on the inside to assure a people . . . that the bank situation is sound. He recites the problems [and] explains the remedy: 'when people find they can get their money when they want it the phantom of fear will soon be laid [to rest]. . . . It was the government's job to straighten out this situation and the job is being performed.'" 18 16 Awalt (1969, p. 368) . 17 The text of the Fireside Chat, and the excerpts that follow, can be found in the New York Times (March 13, 1933, p. 1 Frederick Lewis Allen, the contemporary social historian, confirmed the power of the President's oratory (Allen 1939, p. 110) : "Roosevelt's first Fireside Chat was perfectly attuned. Quiet, uncondescending [sic] , clear, and confident, it was an incredibly skillful performance." However, Allen also emphasized that most people did not understand how the government could accomplish its objective: "The banks opened without any such renewed panic as had been feared. They might not have done so had the people realized that it was impossible, in a few days, to separate the sound banks from the unsound" (p. 110).
Allen suggests that most people did not care what the President said-only the way he said it. But the President's opening words identified two groups of people: the "comparatively few who understand the mechanics of banking . . . [and] the overwhelming majority." How did the President assure the more sophisticated public-and a skeptical presswho could blow the whistle if there was no substance to his promises?
Roosevelt, in fact, delivered a double-barreled message during his Fireside Chat-one for the general public and one for the financiers. To those who understood the mechanics of banking, he said, "Last Thursday [March 9] was the legislation promptly and patriotically passed by the Congress . . . [that] gave authority to develop a program of rehabilitation of our banking facilities. . . . The new law allows the twelve Federal Reserve Banks to issue additional currency on good assets and thus the banks that reopen will be able to meet every legitimate call. The new currency is being sent out by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing to every part of the country."
The Emergency Banking Act, passed by Congress on March 9, 1933, gave the President the backing that he needed to ensure the safety of the reopened banks.
19 Without that legislation, the President's words could not have carried the day.
19 The text of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 appears in its entirety in the New York Times (March 10, 1933, p. 2).
The Emergency Banking Act of 1933
The including "any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by banking institutions as defined by the President, and export, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin." Title II gave the Comptroller of the Currency the power to restrict the operations of a bank with impaired assets and to appoint a conservator, who "shall take possession of the books, records, and assets of every description of such bank, and take such action as may be necessary to conserve the assets of such bank pending further disposition of its business." Title III allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to determine whether a bank needed additional funds to operate and "with the approval of the President request the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to subscribe to the preferred stock in such association, State bank or trust company, or to make loans secured by such stock as collateral." Title IV provided for issuance by the Roosevelt recognized that the restoration of confidence was the most important ingredient for a successful reopening: "Confidence and courage are the essentials of success in carrying out our plan." 23 Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 440) confirm the role of confidence: "Panics arose out of or were greatly intensified by a loss of confidence in the ability of banks to convert deposits into currency." However, Roosevelt did not inspire great confidence when he said the first banks to be reopened were those that "on first examination by the Treasury have been already found to be all right." Nor did regulations against hoarding assure people that the banks were sound; if anything, the reverse was more likely. The key to creating confidence in the reopened banks rested with Titles III and IV of the Emergency Banking Act. Title IV gave the Federal Reserve the flexibility to issue emergency currency-Federal Reserve Bank Notes-backed by any assets of a commercial bank. The contemporary press recognized the power of the emergency currency provision: "The new currency feature of the law is one of the most important of the many extraordinary powers given to this administration . . . which stem from the Aldrich-Vreeland Act . . . invoked in 1914 for the issuance of about $386,000,000 in emergency currency." 24 The link to Aldrich-Vreeland currency, which succeeded in defusing the financial crisis at the outbreak of World War I, conferred credibility on the power of Title IV of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933. 25 The Wall Street Journal wrote: "Banks which are believed to be 100% sound would be reopened as soon as their condition could be checked. . . . All banks so reopened, it was pointed out, could under Title 4 and under machinery already in existence obtain the cash resources necessary from the Federal Reserve banks."
Roosevelt . . . delivered a doublebarreled message during his Fireside
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Title IV of the Emergency Banking Act promised more than just the availability of cash to reopened banks. It also created the expectation that the government would guarantee all depositors against loss, without limit. As the New York Times reported: "Some bankers who were here today . . . interpreted the emergency banking act as a measure under which the government practically guarantees, not officially but morally, the deposits in the banks which it permits to reopen. This point of view was based on the fact that banks permitted to open are characterized as 100 per cent sound and assured of sufficient currency to meet all obligations" [italics added].
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Title III of the Emergency Banking Act added to the public's perception of a guarantee, according to the New York Times: "The privilege to be extended to banks to issue preferred stock to be taken over by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation when they are in need of funds for capital purposes or reorganization, is also pointed to as another feature of the governmental program which fits in with the theory that a virtual guarantee is extended to depositors." 28 Two days earlier, 
Roosevelt recognized that the restoration of confidence was the most important ingredient for a successful reopening [of banks].
sheet, but only the Federal Reserve could provide unlimited currency to banks to meet a run on deposits. Acting Comptroller of the Currency Awalt confirmed the implicit guarantee many years later, but also hinted at concern over Federal Reserve support: "It was felt that the various Federal Reserve Banks must back the reopened banks to the hilt, and that it was no time for any conservative head of a Federal Reserve Bank to exercise his conservatism, should demand be made for currency. We reasoned, therefore, that if the Federal Reserve agreed to a reopening of a particular bank, it would necessarily be forced to back it one hundred percent" [italics added]. Awalt (1969, p. 368) . 31 Goldenweiser (1951, p. 165) . from Roosevelt's Treasury Secretary, William Woodin, to Governor George Harrison of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, quoting President Roosevelt: "It is inevitable that some losses may be made by the Federal Reserve banks in loans to their member banks. The country appreciates, however, that the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks are operating entirely under Federal Law and the recent Emergency Bank Act greatly enlarges their powers to adapt their facilities to a national emergency. Therefore, there is definitely an obligation on the federal government to reimburse the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks for losses which they may make on loans made under these emergency powers. I do not hesitate to assure you that I shall ask the Congress to indemnify any of the 12 Federal Reserve banks for such losses. I am confident that Congress will recognize its obligation to these Federal Banks should the occasion arise, and grant such request."
32 Roosevelt clearly went out on a limb to ensure the Federal Reserve's cooperation. Congress understood the role of emergency currency in guaranteeing bank deposits. As the New York Times observed: "the framing and adoption of the emergency banking law . . . went far to offset demands in Congress for a separate guarantee bill."
33 Of course, the public did not know the details of the Federal Reserve's reluctance to lend, nor did it know of Roosevelt's indemnification scheme. 34 Most Americans, in fact, did not read the New York Times, so they were unaware of the publicity accorded the implicit guarantee. In sum, the contemporary commentary suggests that Roosevelt's rhetoric in his first Fireside Chat gave the public confidence in the opened banks. Business and banking leaders-and the press-could rely on the Emergency Banking Act to deliver on the government's moral obligation to guarantee all deposits. The key question is: When the banks reopened, did the public behave as though it believed in the newly guaranteed safety of the banking system?
The Evidence
On the very first day that the banks reopened, the press described depositors anxious to redeposit their cash. A front 35 Minutes, March 11, 1933 , p. 172, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Archives. 36 March 13, 1933 This tactic is consistent with the approach of the new Administration. Alter (2006, pp. 179-81 ) confirms Roosevelt's Machiavellian side by documenting his failure to cooperate with Hoover in the month before the election. He suggests that "It is hard to avoid the conclusion that [Roosevelt] intentionally allowed the economy to sink lower so that he could enter the presidency in a more dramatic fashion." page headline in the Chicago The data on currency in circulation in Table 1 On the very first day that the banks reopened, the press described depositors anxious to redeposit their cash.
April 12, 1933, a total of 4,215 banks, with deposits of nearly $4 billion, remained closed (Wicker 1996, pp. 146-7) .
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The stock market provides a second assessment of the events from March 3, 1933 (the last trading day before the Bank Holiday), to March 15, 1933 (the day the New York Stock Exchange resumed trading). The Dow Jones Industrial Average increased by a record 15.34 percent on March 15, 1933-the largest one-day percentage price increase ever recorded, according to Siegel (1998, p. 183) . However, Siegel omits this day from his ranking of largest daily stock price increases, presumably because trading had been suspended for almost two calendar weeks. Recall that Temin and Wigmore (1990, p. 488) Stock prices fluctuate for many reasons-and sometimes for no reason at all-but the magnitude of the favorable response on March 15, 1933, implies that the successful reopening of the banking system cannot be ignored. The contemporary press confirms the connection. The day after the market reopened, the New York Times observed: "The robust advance in stocks and bonds was interpreted-and correctly so-as Wall Street's mark of approval of the steps taken by the President and Congress in the interval to end the financial disorder." 49 The
Wall Street Journal added: "The emergency banking act lifted 46 To measure the normal variability of returns during this period, we first calculate the daily standard deviation of returns (continuously compounded) on the Dow Jones Industrial Average from January 4, 1932 , through March 3, 1933 . We then split the sample on November 8, 1932, the date of Roosevelt's election, and perform an F-test to determine whether the pre-election (January 4, 1932 , through November 7, 1932 ) daily standard deviation of 3.45 percent equals the post-election (November 9, 1932 , through March 3, 1933 daily standard deviation of 2.48 percent. The F-statistic equals 2.03, with 213 and 77 degrees of freedom, implying a p-value of .001. Thus, we reject the hypothesis of equality for the pre-and post-election standard deviation of returns. Daily data on the Dow Jones Industrial Average (and the estimate of the daily standard deviation) did not include the abbreviated Saturday trading sessions. 47 The eight trading days between March 3 and March 15 exclude Saturdays. Recognition that variance over nontrading days is lower than variance over trading days (see French and Roll [1986] and Lockwood and Linn [1990] ) would increase the t-statistic. 48 The reduced daily standard deviations for the CRSP indexes compared with the S&P 500 Index and the Dow Jones Industrial Average are due, in part, to the lower standard deviation of returns on the abbreviated Saturday sessions compared with the rest of the week. 49 March 16, 1933, p. 25. The President placed the responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of the payments system with the federal government. Congress passed the Emergency Banking Act of 1933, giving the President the power to restore confidence in the banking system by establishing 100 percent guarantees for bank deposits. And Roosevelt did not hesitate to use that power to end the banking crisis. We can draw three main conclusions from this event. First, management of the banking crisis required bold and decisive action. Second, rhetoric alone did not solve the crisis; a substantive component was required to restore the banking system to normal operations. Finally, the speed with which the Bank Holiday and the Emergency Banking Act reestablished the integrity of the payments system demonstrates the power of credible regime-shifting policies.
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March 16, 1933 16, , p. 6. 51 March 16, 1933 . The press cited a second factor buoying stock prices: favorable Congressional legislation giving Roosevelt the power to reduce veterans' benefits and federal salaries. According to the Chicago Tribune (March 16, 1933, p. 1) : "What the country is witnessing is a president doing swiftly and certainly what the overwhelming majority of the people demanded. . . . No sooner had he ended the bank panic than Mr. Roosevelt began pushing through Congress the bill for a 500 million dollar reduction in the cost of the federal government and the bill to legalize and tax beer."
